Putin is appealing to an old ghost – Nazism – to gain the support of his people and justify an unjustifiable invasion. In doing so, he is constructing a potentially powerful narrative that, however, as the days go by, falls apart and turns against him.

The mastermind behind the murder of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya and the poisoning of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko is launching his fratricidal war with the aim of “denazifying” and “demilitarizing” Ukraine and “stopping the genocide” of ethnic Russians living in eastern Ukraine. But how true are these arguments?

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, political scientist Francis Fukuyama believed that the political cycle of humanity was coming to a close and that it would lead not to a convergence between capitalism and socialism, but to a triumph of economic and political liberalism. In other words, the American liberal predicted the triumph of the West, of the Western idea and of democracy as a political system.  

According to liberal theorists, the global dominance of democracy as a set of values that in turn entails a system of checks and balances would inevitably lead to greater observance of international law and, therefore, to a prolonged period of peace. For Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War symbolized not only the passage from one period to another, but the end of history itself, that is, the apex of man's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the ultimate form of government to which all human beings could aspire. 

However, Putin has shown us time and again that the realpolitik It matters and we cannot therefore ignore the strategic interests of states. The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 – by undercover Russian soldiers – and, more recently, Moscow’s cowardly invasion of Ukraine, make it clear that democratic values are not the ultimate refuge for all peoples. Moreover, if democracy is not in common use, the relative peace of the post-Cold War period cannot be perpetual either.

Liberal theorists claim that democracy, economic interdependence and membership in international organisations would be enough to bring countries closer together and resolve conflicts that might arise between them. In this sense, the advance of globalisation, as well as the growing interconnection and economic interdependence that it entails, would serve as a brake on the ambitions of autocrats. Nothing could be further from the truth. Despite the multi-million dollar and varied sanctions imposed on the Russian economy, Putin's inner circle and the country's major oligarchs, the war continues with no signs of ending.

So what factors explain Russia's decision to invade Ukraine? Why did an economy as interconnected with the world as Russia's – unlike North Korea, for example – risk receiving an unprecedented accumulation of sanctions?

What are Russia's strategic interests?

Clearly, the Russian political class should have considered that the gains would be greater, perhaps not in economic terms, but certainly in political and security terms.

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, one of the greatest exponents of offensive neorealism, John Mearsheimer, postulated in Foreign Affairs that both the United States and its European Union allies shared most of the responsibility for the crisis. Like most voices in 2022, the University of Chicago professor did not hesitate to point to NATO expansion as the cause of the Russian reaction. According to Mearsheimer, Russia perceived that its strategic interests were threatened and feared, among other things, that NATO would establish a naval base in the Black Sea, where Russia has maintained a significant fleet since 1790, the year in which Catherine the Great seized the Crimean peninsula from the Ottoman Empire.

If NATO began to expand in 1999 by incorporating the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland into its fold, and even dared to incorporate the former Soviet republics of Estonia and Latvia, which border the Russian Federation, in 2004, why did Russia take so many years to attack Ukraine? Most experts attribute this to Russia's weakness at the time.

In addition, Ukraine's border with Russia is significantly longer (1,576 km) than that of Estonia (294 km) and Latvia (217 km), the distance to Moscow is shorter and less rugged, and Ukraine's strategic importance is incomparable (passage of Russian gas pipelines to Europe, base of operations of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, land rich in minerals, high grain production, heavy machinery, weapons, nuclear power generation, etc.).

In cultural terms, Russia claims its historical origin and cultural heritage in Kyiv Rus (Kievska Rus), a federation of Slavic tribes dating back to the 9th century, with Kyiv as its capital. Although Ukraine, Russia and Belarus all have their origins in this federation, it is the current Ukrainian capital – and not Moscow, Minsk or St. Petersburg – that is the undisputed heir to this legacy. Hence, Putin’s claims that “Ukraine does not exist” or that “it is not a neighbouring country, but part of our history, culture and spiritual space” are the other way around. Russia is part of Ukraine’s history. This was the case for more than three hundred years (from the end of the 9th century to the mid-13th century), so Putin’s historical claims are unfounded and could rather be used by a Ukrainian nationalist leader.

However, just because Russia was weak in the 1990s does not mean that Russian officials did not repeatedly disagree with the West's intentions, and believed – deludedly? – that their counterparts understood their security concerns. In that sense, Putin was not the first to warn the West about what would happen if NATO continued to expand towards its borders.

Already in 1995, during the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the then President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, noted:

“This is the first sign of what could happen when NATO reaches the very borders of the Russian Federation…The flames of war could erupt across the whole of Europe.”

Boris Yeltsin, 1995

That was not the first wake-up call, nor the most important, but it does show us that States have strategic interests that transcend their leaders.

Because there is no global authority to turn to – the principle of anarchy – neorealists argue that states must defend themselves – the principle of self-help. If they do not, they risk being wiped out. To prevent this, states need to strengthen their military capabilities and eliminate threats to their security.

That is precisely what Putin has done so far. Hence, we should not be surprised by the invasion of Georgia in 2008 (a few months after NATO openly considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine), the invasion from within and subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014, or even the current fratricidal war against the Zelenskyy government.

What should surprise us – despite the impressive array of economic sanctions against Russia – is the passivity of the United States and the European Union in relation to Russia's flagrant violations of the sovereignty of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

The above obviously does not justify any invasion, but it does explain Russian expansionism. In that sense, the “denazification” of Ukraine is a crude means of mobilizing and unifying Russian society against a historical enemy that inflicted great damage on the Soviet population – starting with the Ukrainian population, where millions of people died at the hands of the Nazis – and which, therefore, easily materializes evil. In essence, it is nothing more than empty talk that is not supported by reality, since Zelenskyy is Jewish, an ally of Israel and a relative of Jews who perished in the Holocaust.

Regarding the alleged genocide against ethnic Russians, the UN has found no evidence of such events, nor has it documented persecution against that or any other ethnic minority (even in the Donbas region, ethnic Russians barely make up 251% of the population). However, the opposite has been documented: harassment of Ukrainians for speaking Ukrainian in the occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk and Lugansk.

It is worth noting that the 1996 Ukrainian Constitution safeguards the rights of all ethnic minorities living on its territory. According to Article 10 of the Constitution, “the free development, use and protection of the Russian language, as well as other languages of national minorities in Ukraine is guaranteed.” And while Article 11 states that “The State promotes the consolidation and development of the Ukrainian nation, its historical consciousness, traditions and culture, it shall also promote the development of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of all indigenous peoples and national minorities of Ukraine.” Thus, these claims are also unfounded.

Finally, there remains the question of the demilitarization of Ukraine and its status as a neutral country. Although the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada) declared in 1990 its “intention that Ukraine should become a permanently neutral state, outside of any military bloc” (Article IX), this wish was not reflected in the Constitution that was promulgated six years later and, therefore, Russia cannot reproach Ukraine for its rapprochement with NATO, nor can it justify its invasion in violation of this principle.

Even if Ukraine did not live up to this “intention,” Ukraine is a sovereign country and can therefore decide which organization to join based on its interests and values. However, Ukraine can still blame Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom for failing to fulfill their commitments to provide security to the countries that renounced their nuclear arsenal in 1994 (Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan).

It is clear, however, that Russia will not stop until it has destroyed Ukraine's military capabilities, deposed Zelenskyy, established a puppet government and achieved state neutrality.  

Octavio Miguel Gonzalez Segovia

Postdoctoral researcher at the Center for International Relations of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM).